

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY**

J.M., S.C., A.N., and P.T. individually and
on behalf of all other persons similarly
situated

Plaintiffs,

v.

SHEREEF M. ELNAHAL, M.D.,
Commissioner, New Jersey Department of
Health, in his official capacity;

CAROLE JOHNSON,
Commissioner, New Jersey
Department of Human Services, in her
official capacity;

ELIZABETH CONNOLLY,
Acting Commissioner, New Jersey
Department of Human Services, in her
official capacity;

VALERIE L. MIELKE,
Assistant Commissioner, New Jersey
Division of Mental Health and Addiction
Services, as an individual and in her official
capacity;

TOMIKA CARTER,
CEO, Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital,
as an individual and in her official capacity;

TERESA A. McQUAIDE,
Former Acting CEO, Greystone Park
Psychiatric Hospital, as an individual and in
her official capacity;

ROBERT EILERS, M.D.,
Medical Director, New Jersey Division of
Mental Health and Addiction Services, as an
individual and in his official capacity;

Case No.:

**CLASS ACTION COMPLAINT
FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF**

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

Judge:

1 HARLAN M. MELLK, M.D.,
2 Chief of Medicine, Greystone Park
3 Psychiatric Hospital, as an individual and in
his official capacity;

4 EVARISTO O. AKERELE, M.D.,
5 Medical Director, Greystone Park
6 Psychiatric Hospital, as an individual and in
his official capacity;

7 LISA CIASTON, ESQ.,
8 Legal Liaison, New Jersey Division of
9 Mental Health and Addiction Services, as an
individual and in her official capacity;

10 SWANG S. OO, ESQ.,
11 Deputy Attorney General, State of New
12 Jersey, as an individual and in her official
capacity;

13 GURBIR GREWAL, ESQ.,
14 Attorney General, State of New Jersey, in his
official capacity; and

15 PHILIP D. MURPHY,
16 Governor, State of New Jersey, in his official
capacity

17 Defendants.

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19 Plaintiffs J.M., S.C., A.N., and P.T., by their undersigned attorneys, bring this suit against
20 defendants, as individuals and acting on behalf of all persons similarly situated who have been,
21 are presently, or will be hospitalized at Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital whose constitutional
22 and statutory rights continue to be violated on a daily basis.
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

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2 1. Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital (hereinafter “Greystone”) is a state-run psychiatric
3 hospital located in Morris Plains, New Jersey. Greystone originally opened in 1876, and by 1895,
4 it was serving patients from nine northern New Jersey counties. Over the years, additional
5 buildings were added to the campus. In the 1920s, Greystone undertook an ambitious ten-year
6 construction plan. By 1954, the Hospital reached its highest residential census: 6,719 patients.
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8 2. From the late 1950s to the mid-1970s, Greystone experienced a long decline, characterized
9 by dwindling patient population, aging buildings, and recurrent scandals. In 1974, in response to
10 public complaints, law enforcement convened a grand jury investigation into the management and
11 operation of Greystone. The initial focus of the investigation was allegations that patients had
12 been beaten and otherwise mistreated by Greystone employees. Instead, the Grand Jury, which
13 met for six months, examined over 300 exhibits and heard from 83 witnesses. It returned a lengthy
14 presentment against many aspects of the hospital management, including deficiency in the
15 administration, the lack of effective personnel policies, professional nonfeasance on the part of
16 staff psychiatrists, physical assaults on patients by nursing personnel, and the failure to respect the
17 statutory mandate of adequate and humane care and treatment, as required by N.J.S.A. 30:4-24.1.
18 Five individuals were eventually indicted for criminal conduct, which included charges of drug
19 distribution, sodomy, attempted sodomy, and Medicaid fraud.
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22 3. In the mid-1970s, a class action lawsuit was instituted on behalf of the patients at Greystone
23 to enjoin the Greystone administration from directing treatment and maintaining conditions in a
24 manner in violation of the constitutional and statutory rights of the plaintiffs. See Doe v. Klein,
25 143 N.J. Super. 134, (App. Div. 1976). In 1977, the Attorney General and the Public Advocate
26 agreed to a lengthy Stipulation of Settlement, which terminated the litigation and outlined a
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1 detailed recitation of standards and services to ensure the rights of the patients. The settlement
2 agreement included the establishment of a court-appointed oversight committee.

3 4. The oversight committee met for over forty years and issued numerous scathing reports of
4 conditions at the hospital. In 2000, the oversight committee found deplorable conditions existed
5 at Greystone: patients were forced to use dirty bathrooms, forced to sleep in overcrowded rooms,
6 forced to sleep on bare floors, were unsupervised, and were involved in serious physical
7 altercations.
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9 5. The reports prompted then-Governor Christine Whitman to call for the closing of the old
10 Greystone and the creation of a new, state-of-the art hospital, which opened in July 2008 at a cost
11 of \$200 million. A judge disbanded the oversight committee one year later.
12

13 6. The “new” Greystone replaced five aging treatment buildings and a 131-year-old
14 administration building with a 450-bed facility in a single, self-contained building. The new
15 hospital included a treatment mall with over 21 rooms for various activities and a large auditorium.
16 There were also on-site residential cottages for 60 additional patients transitioning to more
17 independent community living. Accordingly, the facility was designed to house a maximum of
18 510 patients.
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20 7. Despite the physical transformation of Greystone, history is now repeating itself as the prior
21 tragic conditions have since resurfaced.
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23 8. Since the opening of the rebuilt Greystone Hospital in 2008, there have been several
24 developments which have caused the population level to swell far beyond its capacity. In June
25 2012, as part of a budget-saving decision by then-Governor Chris Christie, the State closed
26 Hagedorn Psychiatric Hospital, a State facility located in Glen Gardner and which housed
27 approximately 285 geriatric patients. While some of those patients were released to community
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1 placements, such as nursing homes, many were transferred to Greystone and were often placed on
2 units with younger, more assaultive patients.

3 9. Overcrowding at Greystone was further exacerbated by Governor Christie's decision to
4 close two New Jersey institutions, which housed 415 people with developmental disabilities. The
5 North Jersey Developmental Center in Totowa was closed in the summer of 2014, and the
6 Woodbridge Developmental Center was closed six months later, requiring the State to find
7 placements for hundreds of individuals with serious cognitive disabilities. Many of these
8 developmentally disabled patients were transferred to Greystone, a psychiatric hospital neither
9 designed nor intended to accommodate individuals with developmental disabilities. Likewise,
10 many staff members, who were solely trained to care for developmentally disabled patients, were
11 transferred to Greystone and were ill-equipped to provide psychiatric care.

14 10. Greystone patient admissions increased from 393 admissions in 2009 to 580 admissions in
15 2013, a total increase of 47%. The total patient census increased from 460 patients in 2009 to 570
16 patients in 2014, a total increase of 24%. At that same time, due to administrative mismanagement,
17 the number of experienced staff, including psychiatrists, nurses, and mental health workers,
18 plummeted. For example, although the hospital was designed to utilize at least 29 staff
19 psychiatrists to treat a maximum of 510 patients, the failure to replace psychiatrists who had
20 resigned or retired resulted in only approximately less than one-fourth of the positions being filled.
21 This shortage resulted in drastically increased caseloads and, coupled with other numerous
22 administrative failures that will be described below, dramatically decreased the opportunity for
23 patients to receive appropriate psychiatric care.

26 11. Chronic administrative failures, the increased daily patient census, the inability of the
27 doctors to spend sufficient time with the patients, and overall insufficient staffing levels of
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1 competent staff have resulted in a drastic increase in assaults, suicide attempts, drug overdoses,
2 and fatal medication mismanagement.

3 12. Defendants, rather than working with doctors and staff to better the conditions at the
4 hospital, created an “atmosphere of terror and retaliation” to intimidate doctors and staff who dared
5 to speak out against its grossly negligent conduct. Rather than trying to save lives, Defendants
6 exacerbated these harmful, life-threatening conditions, and also engaged in fraudulent and reckless
7 conduct, much of which was hidden from their staff, the courts, and the public.

8
9 13. At the time of this filing, there is a mass exodus of staff psychiatrists. Of the minimum
10 twenty-nine required positions, only approximately six full-time psychiatrists remain. More will
11 leave before the end of this year.

12 13 **JURISDICTION**

14 14. This action is brought pursuant to the Constitution of the United States and pursuant to 42
15 U.S.C. 1983. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court by 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C 1331 and
16 1343(a)(3) and (4), this being an action seeking redress for the violation of constitutional and civil
17 rights.

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19 15. Plaintiffs further invoke this Court’s supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367,
20 over any and all state law claims and as against all parties that are so related to claims in this action
21 within the original jurisdiction of this court that they form part of the same case or controversy.

22 16. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey pursuant
23 to 28 U.S.C. 1391 (a) because it is the district in which Plaintiffs’ claims arose.
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1 **RELEVANT LAWS**

2 **THE FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF**
3 **THE UNITED STATES**

4 17. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment prevent any State from the depriving “any person of
5 life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
6 the equal protection of the laws.”

7 **TITLE II, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT**

8 18. 42 U.S.C. Section 12132 and the regulations promulgated thereto, 28 C.F.R. 35, state that
9 “a public entity may not, through its methods of administration, deny public benefits or subject
10 individuals with disabilities to discrimination on the basis of such disabilities.”
11

12 **SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT**

13 19. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which is codified as 29 U.S.C. Section 794,
14 and the regulations promulgated thereto, 28 C.F.R. Part 41, state that “no public entity receiving
15 federal funds shall deny any person the benefits of a public service, or otherwise subject a disabled
16 person to discrimination, on the basis of that person’s disability.”
17

18 **NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION ARTICLE 1, PARAGRAPHS 1 & 14**

19 20. New Jersey Constitution Article 1, Paragraph 1 states that “[a]ll persons are by nature free
20 and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of
21 enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of
22 pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”
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24 21. New Jersey Constitution Article 1, Paragraph 14 states that “[t]he privilege of the writ of
25 habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion or invasion the public safety may
26 require it.”
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PATIENT BILL OF RIGHTS

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2 22. Under N.J.S.A. 30:4-24.2, the Patients’ Bill of Rights protects patients’ rights in two
3 categories: those that may not be denied under any circumstances (subpart “f”) and those that can
4 be denied for “good cause” (subpart “e”).
5

6 23. In relevant part, the following rights cannot be denied under any circumstances: 1) to be
7 free from unnecessary or excessive medication; and 2) to be free from physical restraint and
8 isolation except for emergency situations. In relevant part, the following rights can be denied for
9 “good cause”: 1) right to privacy and dignity; 2) right to the least restrictive conditions necessary
10 to achieve the purposes of treatment; and 3) right to receive prompt and adequate medical treatment
11 for any physical ailment.
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13 24. Under N.J.S.A. 30:4-24.2(g), for a right to be denied for “good cause,” the following must
14 take place: 1) a program director determines that it is imperative to deny these rights; 2) a written
15 notice of denial of rights must be filed in the patient’s treatment record; and 3) the patient and
16 attorney must be provided written notice of the denial of rights.
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INVOLUNTARY COMMITMENT TO TREATMENT

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19 25. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.1 to 27.23, the State of New Jersey is responsible for
20 providing care, treatment and rehabilitation to mentally ill persons who are disabled and cannot
21 provide basic care for themselves or who are dangerous to themselves, others, or property. N.J.S.A.
22 30:4-27.1(a). It is the policy of the State that persons in the public mental health system are
23 required to receive inpatient treatment and rehabilitation services in the least restrictive
24 environment in accordance with the highest professional standards and which will enable those
25 persons committed to treatment to return to full autonomy in their community as soon as it is
26 clinically appropriate.
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PARTIES

A. PLAINTIFFS

Plaintiff J.M. was born on August 13, 1939. She was admitted to Greystone on September 3, 2014. She was discharged from Greystone on March 28, 2018.

Plaintiff S.C. was born on May 26, 1960. She was admitted to Greystone on April 20, 2018. She has not been discharged from Greystone.

Plaintiff A.N. was born on August 15, 1993. He was admitted to Greystone on March 23, 2017. He has not been discharged from Greystone.

Plaintiff P.T. was born on October 1, 1959. He was admitted to Greystone on January 14, 1992. He has not been discharged from Greystone.

B. DEFENDANTS

Defendant Shereef M. Elnahal, M.D., is the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Health.

Defendant Carole Johnson is the Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Human Services.

Valerie L. Mielke, is the Assistant Commissioner of the New Jersey Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services.

Tomika Carter, is the CEO at Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital.

Teresa A. McQuaide is the Former Interim CEO at Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital.

Robert Eilers, M.D., is the Medical Director of the New Jersey Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services.

Harlan M. Mellk, M.D., is the Chief of Medicine at Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital.

Evaristo O. Akerele, M.D., is the Medical Director at Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital.

Lisa Ciaston, Esq., is the Legal Liaison of the New Jersey Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services.

Swang S. Oo, Esq., is a Deputy Attorney General for the State of New Jersey.

Gurbir Grewal, Esq., is the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey.

Philip D. Murphy, is the Governor of the State of New Jersey.

CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

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2 26. Pursuant to R. 23(a) and (b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs bring this
3 action on behalf of themselves and other individuals with serious mental health illnesses currently
4 confined to Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital (hereinafter “Greystone”), previously confined to
5 Greystone, or at serious risk of being confined at Greystone. In order to remedy the violations
6 alleged herein, Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief individually and on behalf of the
7 following class:
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9 All current and former patients of Greystone Park Psychiatric
10 Hospital, at any time during the applicable limitations period

11 27. Plaintiffs seek class certification because:

- 12 a. The composition of the putative class is so numerous that joinder of all individual
13 members is impracticable;
- 14 b. There are questions of law and fact common to the members of the class. These
15 common questions include, for example:
16
- 17 i. Whether the actions and inactions of the Defendants, including the deliberate
18 indifference to medical needs, denial of the right to a safe and humane physical
19 and psychological environment, the denial of the right to be safe from State-
20 created danger, and the denial of the right to be protected from patient-on-patient
21 assaults, constitute violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
22 Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Paragraphs 1 and 14
23 of the New Jersey Constitution;
- 24 ii. Whether the Defendants’ failure to administer services, programs and activities in
25 such a way that patients can enjoy these services free from harm from other
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1 recipients constitutes a violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act and the
2 Rehabilitation Act of 1973; and

3 iii. Whether the Defendants' failure to provide sufficient staffing of psychiatrists to
4 testify at scheduled court review hearings constitutes a violation of New Jersey's
5 Involuntary Psychiatric Commitment Laws
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7 C. Claims of Plaintiffs are typical of the class as a whole;

8 D. Plaintiffs will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class;

9 E. The defendants have acted and/or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the
10 class, such as consistently failing to comply with the state and federal laws in the care and
11 treatment of patients confined at Greystone so that final injunctive relief or corresponding
12 declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole; and
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14 F. Counsel for Plaintiffs is qualified, experienced, and able to conduct this litigation, and will
15 fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.
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17 **STATEMENT OF FACTS**

18 **I. ESCALATING RATE OF ASSAULTS**

19 28. From approximately 2012 to 2017, there were an average of 4.71 assaults per day at
20 Greystone.

21 29. In 2012, the total number of reported assaults at Greystone was 1,832; of those reported
22 assaults, 549 were with injury.

23 30. In 2013, 1,966 assaults were reported; of those, 674 were with injury.

24 31. In 2014, 1,509 assaults were reported; of those, 532 were with injury.

25 32. In 2015, 1,486 assaults were reported; of those, 530 were with injury.

26 33. In 2016, 1,816 assaults were reported; of those, 654 were with injury.
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1 34. In or around August 2017, before the Director of Performance Improvement and
2 Utilization Management was suspended for threatening to disclose the actual data, 908 assaults
3 were reported; 322 were with injury. The number of assaults and injury in 2017 was on track to
4 surpass the highest number of reported assaults and injuries since the opening of the “new”
5 Greystone.
6

7 35. Defendants intentionally kept multiple sets of books regarding the rate of assaults: one set
8 for the public, one set for regulatory agencies, and one set for internal use only. The internal set
9 is the only one with an accurate picture of the astronomical rate of violence at Greystone. Multiple
10 whistleblowers have lost their careers and reputations when they attempted to disclose or refused
11 to unlawfully manipulate this information against the direct orders of Defendants.
12

13 36. On or around February 27, 2014, an Ad Hoc Committee on Safety and Staffing Issues
14 (hereinafter “Ad Hoc Committee”) was established. The reason for establishing the Ad Hoc
15 Committee was an increasing number of complaints from Greystone staff members related to the
16 escalating safety issues on the units, inappropriate staffing levels, and overcrowding of patients.
17 The Ad Hoc Committee consisted of psychiatrists and medical doctors employed by Greystone.
18 The Ad Hoc Committee presented their findings to Defendants in a report dated April 25, 2014.
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20 37. The Ad Hoc Committee found that between 2009 and 2013, the number of admissions
21 increased 47% from 393 to 580. From 2010 to 2013, the increase of patient-to-patient assaults
22 increased 40%, with 970 assaults in 2010 to 1,367 in 2013. From 2010 to 2013, the patient-to-
23 staff assaults increased 40%, with 413 assaults in 2011 to 582 in 2013. From 2009 to 2014, the
24 mortality rate increased by 60%, from 5 deaths in 2010 to 8 in 2013. This report and its
25 recommendations were sent to the Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services.
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1 38. The grave conditions are best summarized in this complaint by Greystone's own Medical
2 Staff Organization. The Medical Staff Organization is theoretically a self-governing body whose
3 primary purpose is to hold physicians collectively accountable for patient safety and clinical
4 performance. On or around October 5, 2017, the Medical Staff Organization met to discuss safety
5 issues, staffing issues, and the collective work environment at Greystone under the
6 mismanagement of Defendants. The Medical Staff Organization consisted of the majority of the
7 staff psychiatrists and medical doctors, who were out of options in the face of the growing crisis
8 at Greystone. During the meeting, the doctors discussed Greystone being over census, staff and
9 patients being assaulted on a near-constant basis, and Defendants' fraudulent misrepresentation of
10 the level of assaults. The Medical Staff Organization stated that the number of assaults being
11 reported was significantly lower than the number of assaults they reviewed. The Medical Staff
12 Organization also looked at the severity of the assaults. An example they discussed included a
13 patient who assaulted staff members at least twenty times before being transferred to Ann Klein
14 Forensic Center. The doctors also discussed Defendants' chronic understaffing of Greystone's
15 psychiatric units, thus compounding the dangers to staff and patients. The number of psychiatrists
16 has been below requirements for a very long time because of resignations and retirements as well
17 as Defendants' deliberate failure to fill the vacancies. The critical positions of Chief of Psychiatry
18 and Medical Director, which are required for Greystone to remain licensed and properly operate,
19 remained vacant. Defendants, to save expenditure, purposefully delayed the hiring of available
20 psychiatrists by prolonging the onboarding process by up to eleven months, despite the dire need
21 for their assistance. The multitude of shortages caused the workload of the remaining psychiatrists
22 to skyrocket, and when coupled with the over census of Greystone, compounded tragic
23 consequences.
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1 39. After the meeting, the Medical Staff Organization unanimously passed a No Confidence
2 Resolution against Defendants for their complete failure to address the safety, staffing, and
3 emergency response issues that had been raised repeatedly by dozens of personnel over the past
4 three years.

5
6 40. The No Confidence Resolution was necessitated by the rapidly deteriorating conditions
7 that eventually precluded Greystone staff from providing an adequate standard of medical and
8 psychiatric care to the patients. Doctors agree that the baseline medical and psychiatric standard
9 of care cannot currently be met for Greystone's patients.

10
11 41. An example of the Defendants' disregard of its staff is illustrated by the Medical Director,
12 Defendant Evaristo O. Akerele, who does not respond to "all-available calls" for help. All-
13 available calls for help are hospital-wide calls over the loud speaker requesting all available hands
14 to a specific unit for emergencies, usually of a life-threatening nature that the staff at the scene
15 cannot safely resolve.

16
17 42. In or around February 2018, when a fellow doctor was severely assaulted by a patient,
18 Defendant Akerele did not check on him, though he lay on the ground with a concussion,
19 unconscious while waiting for an ambulance. Virtually every doctor who was on duty that day
20 came to see their injured colleague, who could not get up, and had blood covering his face and
21 torso. When Defendant Akerele was informed of this incident in his office, he refused to check
22 on the injured doctor, and responded that he was "too busy."

23
24 43. Virtually every doctor at Greystone has been assaulted. Some examples include:

- 25 • Dr. Marek Belz was assaulted on several occasions in the forensic unit,
26 including a time when he was punched in the head. He subsequently
27 resigned in 2016, having only worked at Greystone for fewer than five
28 months.

- 1 • Dr. Seung Lee, an evening on-call psychiatrist, was severely assaulted by
2 two patients when responding to an on-call request. Dr. Lee was
3 subsequently hospitalized.
- 4 • Dr. Mohammad Ghazi, another evening on-call psychiatrist, was assaulted
5 several times by patients on an evening shift; he elected to retire in 2017.
- 6 • Dr. Joselito Domingo was assaulted on several occasions.
- 7 • Dr. Aldonia Swamy was assaulted on several occasions.
- 8 • Dr. Walter Bakun was assaulted on several occasions.
- 9 • Dr. Anthony Gotay was assaulted on several occasions.
- 10 • Dr. Ravi Baliga was lifted off the ground, pushed against the wall, and
11 thrown to the floor by a patient and robbed.
- 12 • Dr. Michael Stewart was assaulted several times in an Admissions Unit.
- 13 • Dr. Gerry Gaviola was assaulted and had his nose broken.
- 14 • Dr. Danijela Ivelja-Hill was assaulted and had her ACL torn.
- 15 • Dr. Robert Becker, the former Chief of Psychiatry, was assaulted.

16 44. From approximately August 1, 2017, to August 13, 2017, one patient assaulted six staff
17 members and three other patients.

18 45. The level of assaults has caused significant problems with staff retention. For example:

- 19 • Dr. Grogan resigned from Greystone due to concerns regarding the assaults.
- 20 • Dr. Verdi did not accept a full-time position, citing safety concerns
21 regarding the assaults.
- 22 • Dr. Drew Tepper, who subsequently accepted a position in the New Jersey
23 prison system, did not accept a full-time position at Greystone, citing safety
24 concerns regarding the assaults.

25 46. Doctors and staff are afraid that they will lose their jobs if they disclose the extent and
26 nature of the violence. Therefore, many incidents go unreported.

27 47. Due to the mismanagement of staff, Greystone is short of nurses, necessitating
28 circumstances where nurses are forced to work sixteen-hour shifts in an attempt to cover the
shortages. On multiple occasions, nurses were told they were not allowed to go home at the end
of their shift, even when they had been assaulted.

48. In or around September 2017, two nurses were crying at their work station after having
huge clumps of their hair ripped from their scalps. Despite their visible injuries, they were not
sent home because there were no nurses available to replace them. As a result of this incident, the

1 responding Medical Officer of the Day asked Defendant McQuaide if she considered these
2 incidents assaults. Defendant McQuaide responded “no.” When asked what Defendant McQuaide
3 considered an assault, she responded “broken bones.” The Medical Officer of the Day is the
4 medical doctor responsible for overseeing the safety of all patients and responding to all medical
5 incidents for any designated day. Defendants do not consider having a large clump of hair ripped
6 from one’s scalp as constituting an “assault with injury.”
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8 49. On or around December 21, 2017, the New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce
9 Development Office of Public Employees and Occupational Safety and Health (hereinafter
10 “PEOSH”) served Pamela Tye-Harlan, Assistant Director at Greystone, a Notice of Order to
11 Comply. PEOSH inspected Greystone from July 14, 2017, to November 30, 2017. Resulting from
12 its investigation, PEOSH issued a “serious violation” under N.J.S.A. 36:6A-33(A), asserting that
13 Greystone did not “provide each employee with employment and a place of employment, which
14 is free from recognized hazards, which cause serious injury, physical harm, or death to the
15 employee.” PEOSH also determined that Greystone’s Violence Prevention Program, which is
16 required by the Violence Prevention in Healthcare Facilities Act and was produced for PEOSH
17 during the inspection, showed the year 2017 on the title cover page. However, a review of the
18 plan’s details and supporting information reflect that the employer’s violence prevention plan was
19 not an active, living document that was being maintained, updated, and assessed annually. PEOSH
20 further determined during the inspection that the elements of the Violence Prevention in Healthcare
21 Facilities Act were not being adhered to by Defendants, thus exposing employees to serious
22 workplace hazards. This finding was supported through a review of the injury and illness OSHA
23 forms 300 and 300A data from the previous three years, 2014, 2015, and 2016, which established
24 a consistent, substantial number of incidents on a rising pattern of patient-inflicted violent acts
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1 against employees. Greystone was required to abate the violation by March 26, 2018, or suffer a
2 per diem penalty of \$7,000.

3 **II. INABILITY OF DEFENDANTS TO PROTECT PATIENTS AND STAFF**

4 50. The Greystone Violence Prevention Committee is ineffective. Although all examples of
5 patient-on-staff assaults are impossible to list, the following are a sampling of the patient-on-staff
6 assaults that occurred between August 2017 and June 2018.

7 51. In or around August 2017, a patient in Unit B1 jumped over the Patient Information Center
8 (hereinafter "PIC") and assaulted a nurse. The PIC is a centralized area on every unit that cordons
9 off the patients from the staff. It also serves as the central location where the staff and patients can
10 interact through a partition that includes a waist-high counter and a lower counter that is staff-
11 facing only.
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13 52. On or around August 16, 2017, one unit made three all-available calls for help when a
14 patient climbed over the PIC and assaulted two nurses. Both nurses subsequently sought medical
15 treatment.
16

17 53. In or around August 2017, a patient on Unit A1 jumped over the PIC and threw a chair at
18 the pay phone.
19

20 54. On or around December 29, 2017, a doctor was assaulted on Unit F3 when a patient
21 punched her in the face.
22

23 55. In or around January 2018, a patient punched a staff member in the eye thereby requiring
24 an emergency room visit, and a different patient bit a nursing supervisor, who then required off-
25 site care.

26 56. In or around January 2018, a female psychiatrist was chased down the hall by a patient
27 who then cornered her and punched her in the face.
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1 57. In or around January 2018, calls for all-available assistance sounded four times on Unit G3
2 in quick succession to deal with a violent patient because adequate help was not arriving.
3 Frequently, doctors have witnessed other staff members responding to all-available calls not as if
4 someone's life or well-being depended on it, but as if they were "out for a stroll."

5
6 58. On or around January 16, 2018, a patient on Unit G3 assaulted three different staff
7 members, one of whom subsequently required a wheelchair for transportation to receive treatment.
8 An all-available call for help had to be sounded four times before help arrived. On that same date,
9 the same patient also assaulted three other nurses.

10
11 59. On or about January 16, 2018, a patient on Unit F3 repeatedly assaulted a female
12 psychologist by pushing her to the floor and subsequently picking her up and throwing her back
13 down to the floor. The patient then climbed on a table, jumped on the psychologist, and proceeded
14 to stomp on her, despite the presence of other staff members. The patient then pushed multiple
15 staff members out of his way. A fellow patient was the only person who tried to stop him as he
16 attempted to hurt more people, but the interceding patient was thrown to the floor and also stomped
17 on. Other patients and staff members then tried to control the aggressor, but he picked up the
18 nursing supervisor and threw her against the wall and picked up another patient and started to
19 choke him. At the end of the assault, three staff members lay injured on the floor. A doctor, along
20 with other staff, was among the first to witness the three staff members lying injured on the floor,
21 severely beaten with help arriving too late.
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23
24 60. On or around the evening of January 19, 2018, a patient of Unit B1 repeatedly punched a
25 nurse in the head.

26
27 61. In or around February 2018, a patient on Unit F3 assaulted approximately twenty
28 employees while waiting for transfer to Ann Klein Forensic Center.

1 62. In or around February 2018, the then-Chief of Psychiatry, Dr. Hilary Hanchuk, was
2 assaulted. When he went to Employee Health Services for his injury, he was denied treatment by
3 the Employee Health Services Nurse.

4 63. On or around February 7, 2018, a patient punched a psychiatrist and knocked him to the
5 floor. He then repeatedly punched him in the head while the psychiatrist lay on the floor
6 unconscious. The assaulted psychiatrist was taken by ambulance to Morristown Medical Center.

7 64. On or around February 21, 2018, a patient on Unit A3 struck a doctor in the face and
8 knocked his eyeglasses to the ground, breaking them.

9 65. On or around February 22, 2018, a male patient on Unit F1 punched a female social worker
10 in the face.

11 66. On or around June 9, 2018, a nurse on Unit B1 was severely beaten by a patient and was
12 subsequently rushed to Morristown Medical Center. On the same day, another nurse was assaulted
13 on Unit G2 but remained on duty.

14 67. In or around September 2018, a patient on Unit G3, who had been stable for months,
15 decompensated because he did not have an assigned psychiatrist. Due to the frequent change of
16 covering psychiatrists, his prescribed medications were repeatedly changed, which caused his
17 decompensation. As a result, he became agitated and paranoid, and struck his psychiatrist in the
18 face.

19 68. From approximately January 2018 through August of 2018, about 105 employees were
20 assaulted by patients and injured significantly enough to necessitate a report to Greystone's human
21 resources. Of those 105 staff members who filed with human resources, at least one-quarter
22 required multiple days off because of their injuries.

1 **III. DEFENDANTS' FAILURE TO HIRE AND MAINTAIN CAPABLE STAFF**

2 69. Patients who are violent and assaultive and require intramuscular injections for sedation
3 are routinely allowed to continue their violent rampages because Defendants do not provide
4 sufficient capable staff to physically intervene.

5
6 70. Patients live in a constant state of fear, knowing that staff cannot protect them. Patients
7 report that they cannot sleep at night due to the increase in patient-on-patient assaults that occur in
8 the evening when there are fewer staff members on duty.

9 71. Doctors and patients report that patients have psychiatrically decompensated due to the
10 constant stress from knowing that staff cannot protect them.

11 72. In or around October 2016, a physician in his sixties came to the aid of a Health Services
12 Technician physically struggling with a violent patient on the outside of a third-floor unit while
13 many staff members stood by and did nothing. When this physician intervened, the patient gouged
14 out the flesh from the physician's face, causing blood to stream on the floor. He required
15 subsequent medical treatment.
16

17 73. On or around August 29, 2017, a patient in Unit D3 jumped over the PIC and threatened
18 the staff members present, who were forced to barricade themselves in the chart room and make
19 an all-available call for help.
20

21 74. In or around October 2017, an assault occurred between two patients where one sustained
22 a four-inch left forehead hematoma, and the other had her hair ripped from her scalp. Prior to the
23 Medical Officer of the Day's arrival, the staff who were present did not physically intervene to
24 stop the assault.
25

26 75. On or around October 22, 2017, the Medical Officer of the Day responded to three separate
27 all-available calls for help regarding a patient inflicting physical harm to self. The doctor had to
28

1 physically restrain the significantly younger male patient, who weighed well over two-hundred
2 pounds, because he was banging his head on the floor. Prior to the doctor's arrival, the staff on
3 the scene did very little, if anything, to stop these repeated episodes of self-harm. The patient now
4 suffers from a non-healing abrasion on his forehead because the staff continues to be unable to
5 stop these episodes.
6

7 76. On or around November 4, 2017, a patient in Unit B2 became violent, broke off a three-
8 foot long piece of a wooden bed frame, and attempted to assault staff. The initial response by staff
9 members was unsuccessful, and staff resorted to calling the police because they were either unable
10 or unwilling to subdue the violent patient.
11

12 77. On or around December 17, 2017, a patient on Unit E2 smashed a wooden chair in half
13 and carried one half in each hand, using them as clubs to bat down parts of the ceiling and an exit
14 sign while yelling and screaming. This volatile situation drove all the other patients into their
15 rooms out of terror. The staff could not control the patient's behavior, and the only option they
16 were left with was to allow the patient to deescalate on his own without staff intervention. The
17 other patients and the staff were seemingly helpless, as they cowered away from him.
18

19 78. On or around January 28, 2018, a female employee was punched in the right eye by a
20 patient on Unit B2 and was taken to Morristown Medical Center. As a result of this attack, three
21 calls for all-available help was sounded on three different units, demonstrating that staff on those
22 units were unable to handle the violence on their own.
23

24 **IV. DANGEROUS OVERCROWDING**

25 79. Units at Greystone are chronically and unlawfully overcrowded. Due to this dangerous
26 overcrowding, geriatric patients have been forced to sleep on thin mattresses on the floor outside
27 the designated sleeping areas, often in common areas. Defendants, in an effort to conceal these
28

1 unlawful accommodations, have created “rooms” that do not exist and which violate the fire and
2 building codes. To conceal this practice, Defendants order their staff to attach fake room numbers
3 to common areas during the evening, and remove them every morning.

4
5 80. The Fire Chief at Greystone has repeatedly informed Defendants that they were violating
6 the fire code, but this practice has continued unabated.

7
8 81. On or around July 19, 2017, a census for overcrowding was conducted and found that
9 numerous units were over census. Fire plans and building codes allow for twenty-five patients per
10 unit. Units A2, A3, B1, D3, E2, F1, F2, and G3 were all over census at twenty-seven patients.
11 Some units have had as many as thirty patients.

12
13 82. Some cottages, meant to hold eight patients, in practice housed up to fourteen patients.
14 Defendants repeatedly ignored the pleas of the doctors and the staff for a response to rectify the
15 overcrowding situation.

16
17 83. An investigator with Disability Rights New Jersey witnessed and documented patients who
18 were sleeping on the floor despite the Defendants’ denial that patients were without beds and that
19 the units were overcrowded.

20
21 84. On or around June 23, 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services completed a
22 sixty-one-page report titled “Summary Statement of Deficiencies.” The Centers for Medicare and
23 Medicaid Services is an agency under the federal Department of Health and Human Services that
24 oversees state hospitals to ensure the delivery of high quality healthcare to patients.

25
26 85. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services found that Greystone failed to ensure
27 each of its patients’ right to personal privacy. When Greystone receives a new patient and no bed
28 is available, Defendants use the units’ study rooms to house patients. To accommodate overflow
patients in the study rooms, staff merely provide them with a privacy divider from 8:00 p.m. to

1 8:00 a.m. To hide this practice, Greystone covers its security cameras while overflow patients are
2 sleeping in the study rooms. The study rooms do not have accessible bathrooms, and these patients
3 are required to use bathrooms in the hallways. Overflow patients who sleep in the study rooms
4 store their belongings in storage rooms.
5

6 86. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services found that Greystone “failed to provide
7 all patients with a wardrobe, bedside table, and plastic storage container to secure their
8 belongings.” Greystone also “failed to maintain the comfort and dignity of all patients by ensuring
9 that all patients receive and have access to personal care items.” These findings were based on the
10 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services’ observations at Greystone, review of Greystone
11 policies and procedures, review of Greystone documents, and staff interviews.
12

13 87. On or around June 21, 2017, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services surveyed
14 Greystone and observed overflow patients in various units. In Unit A2, an overflow patient was
15 observed sleeping on a sofa in the study room with two pillowcases filled with personal belongings
16 next to her. This patient’s personal belongings did not include toiletries or personal care items.
17 This patient was not provided a toothbrush or toothpaste. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
18 Services interviewed another patient who slept in a study room in Unit F3. This patient’s
19 belongings were also kept in the storage room, but he was not provided a plastic storage container
20 or wooden dresser to house them. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services also observed
21 a patient lying on a bed in the study room on Unit D2 with a privacy divider and the security
22 camera covered. A search of this patient’s belongings revealed clothing, but no personal care
23 items. When asked, staff could not confirm whether this patient received personal care items,
24 specifically a toothbrush or toothpaste. Additionally, this patient was not provided a plastic storage
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1 container or wooden dresser for use. Unlike other units, a staff member indicated that the beds
2 and privacy dividers remain set up in the study room on Unit D2 at all times.

3 88. Per Greystone’s “Locked Storage Areas for Patient Belongings” policy, patients, including
4 overflow patients, are supposed to be provided a locked storage area for their personal belongings.
5 This locked storage area should include a wardrobe, bedside table, and up to one plastic storage
6 container. The nursing staff is responsible for educating patients on retaining their locker keys
7 and accessing their lockers. Unlike patients with designated bedrooms, overflow patients do not
8 have access to their personal belongings, wardrobes, or lockers from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. To
9 retrieve any personal items during these hours, they must request them from the staff. The Centers
10 for Medicare and Medicaid Services toured the storage rooms in Units A1 and D2. The Centers
11 for Medicare and Medicaid Services categorized the shared patient storage areas in these units as
12 locked closets. Both storage rooms were cluttered with patient belongings and were not sanitary.
13 Some of the belongings in these storage rooms were not labeled with the owner’s identification.
14 Lastly, contrary to Greystone’s storage policy, patient belongings were stored in bags on the floor.
15

16
17 89. There are myriad studies that show that overcrowding at inpatient psychiatric hospitals
18 dramatically increases the rate of falls, assaults, and suicides.

19
20 90. Because of overcrowding, Defendants pressure doctors to prematurely discharge patients.
21 These patients do not receive appropriate care and treatment and are thus more likely to be
22 readmitted in the future.

23
24 **V. FAILURE OF THE ONE-TO-ONE OBSERVATION SYSTEM**

25 91. Staff psychiatrists are constantly pressured by Defendants to ignore the requirement for
26 one-to-one observation when patients are imminently dangerous. One-to-one observation is
27 implemented when a Mental Health Technician is ordered by a doctor to continuously observe an
28

1 individual patient for a period of time during acute physical or mental illness, such as during
2 periods of severe aggression, physical violence, or suicidal ideation. The Mental Health
3 Technician performing one-to-one observation duty is mandated to deescalate and intervene when
4 the assigned patient becomes aggressive or suicidal. One-to-one observation is standard operating
5 procedure across virtually all psychiatric facilities in the country.
6

7 92. Defendant Akerele orders that patients be taken off one-to-one observation prematurely,
8 with no regard for patient safety. He has required staff psychiatrists to justify their positions of
9 keeping patients on one-to-one observation in a calculated and systematic attempt to pressure the
10 doctors to take patients off. The motivation of this is to advance Defendants' agenda to reduce the
11 costs involved with one-to-one observation care at the expense of employee and patient safety.
12 Defendant Akerele burdens already-overworked doctors with an additional average of five hours
13 a week to defend their position of keeping patients safe.
14

15 93. For example, on or around February 24, 2018, an employee was punched in the head by a
16 patient after the patient was taken off one-to-one observation that day. Later that same day, another
17 employee was punched in the right temple by another patient after that patient was also
18 prematurely taken off one-to-one observation. That staff member was taken to Morristown
19 Medical Center because of the assault.
20

21 94. Defendants are aware of the dangerous consequences of prematurely taking violent patients
22 off one-to-one observation. For example, on or around August 30, 2013, an order came "from
23 Trenton" to stop all one-to-one observation and treatment for all patients on a holiday weekend,
24 citing cost. Immediately, on the implementation of this order, a patient, who was scheduled for
25 transfer to Ann Klein Forensic Center for assaulting seven other patients and multiple staff
26 members previously, severely assaulted another patient. This assault prompted the then-CEO to
27
28

1 implement an emergency order restoring one-to-one observations. Just prior to that incident,
2 another patient whose one-to-one status was discontinued exposed himself to a newly admitted
3 female patient by waving his penis in front of her face as she lay on the transferring ambulance
4 stretcher. He then ran over to two other female patients and danced in circles around them with
5 his penis exposed.
6

7 95. In or around September 2018, Defendant Akerele ordered a patient who has history of pica
8 (a condition of chronically ingesting foreign bodies that are often indigestible) and assaultive
9 behavior off one-to-one observation, despite the repeated protest of the treating psychiatrist.
10 Defendant Akerele, in a cavalier fashion, dismissed the treating psychiatrist's concern that the
11 patient was far too unstable to be off one-to-one. Defendant Akerele wrote an order discontinuing
12 the patient from one-to-one observation. This patient then subsequently ingested a dangerous
13 substance, necessitating her admission to the ER and possibly surgery.
14

15 96. Defendants are also aware of numerous incidents where a patient, rather than staff, saved
16 an individual from death or disability. In circumstances where a Mental Health Technician was
17 assigned to one-to-one observation, oftentimes the technician's lack of training and ability
18 rendered the technician ineffective. On or around November 18, 2017, a patient attacked his
19 mother while on one-to-one observation. He punched her in the mouth, lacerating her lower lip,
20 and impaling it on her lower incisors. Then he tossed her to the floor and repeatedly stomped on
21 her chest, fracturing multiple ribs. Fortunately, a patient came to her rescue by physically
22 intervening, thus saving this elderly woman's life. The staff present at the scene, including the
23 assigned one-to-one Mental Health Technician, stood by and watched. This victim was admitted
24 to ICU for an intracranial hemorrhage, chest trauma with multiple fractured ribs, as well as other
25 injuries. She suffered permanent brain damage as a result of this assault. Just earlier that week,
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1 that same patient severely assaulted a developmentally disabled patient. This victim was rushed
2 to Morristown Medical Center, having suffered massive soft tissue damage. A physician who
3 treated him observed that after the assault, it was impossible to part the patient's eyelid to examine
4 the eyeball underneath.

5
6 97. On or around January 8, 2018, two patients were about to engage in a physical altercation
7 on Unit B1. One of the patients had a one-to-one Mental Health Technician who never called for
8 help or tried to separate or assist in the de-escalation of the altercation, but merely watched as a
9 doctor in his sixties with a fractured wrist attempted to separate the participants.

10
11 98. On or around February 21, 2018, on Unit B3, a patient assaulted a nurse, fracturing her
12 thumb and inflicting extensive soft tissue injuries that mandated surgery. The patient was on one-
13 to-one observation, but the assigned one-to-one Mental Health Technician did not stop the assault.

14
15 99. On or around March 2, 2018, on Unit G1, a seventy-one-year-old geriatric patient with a
16 deformed spine from osteoporosis was pushed to the ground by another patient, who subsequently
17 began to stomp on the geriatric patient's head as he lay on the floor. The staff who witnessed the
18 attack indicated that the assailant stomped on the geriatric patient's head six times. The geriatric
19 patient was then unresponsive, and staff called a code "BLUE" (an emergency situation in which
20 a patient is in cardiopulmonary arrest, requiring a team of providers to begin immediate
21 resuscitative efforts). The geriatric patient was taken to Morristown Medical Center and was
22 diagnosed with a subdural hematoma (intracranial bleeding). In the days leading up to the assault,
23 the assailant was throwing chairs at staff, slamming doors, throwing trash cans and food trays at
24 people, and breaking the toilet in his room. Defendants' systemic pressuring of doctors to keep
25 patients off one-to-one observation for fiscal reasons directly contributed to this violence, as the
26 assailant should have been on one-to-one observation.
27
28

1 one doctor was finally able to convince Defendants of the illegal activity, the patient was scheduled
2 to be transferred to Ann Klein Forensic Center. Unfortunately for this patient, he died of a heroin
3 overdose the night Greystone approved the transfer.

4
5 105. On or around June 2, 2018, a patient on Unit E2 overdosed on heroin and required two
6 doses of Narcan and was rushed to the emergency room at Morristown Medical Center.

7 **VII. INADEQUATE MEDICAL CARE TO MONITOR DANGEROUS**
8 **MEDICATIONS**

9 106. In addition to the influx of illegal drugs, patients have died at Greystone and at emergency
10 rooms from the cardiotoxic effects of psychiatric medications administered at Greystone, most
11 notably clozapine. Clozapine is an antipsychotic medication used predominately to treat
12 schizophrenia, which can lower the risks of suicidal behavior in patients with schizophrenia and
13 schizoaffective disorder. Multiple deaths and life-threatening emergencies at Greystone have been
14 attributed to clozapine toxicity by an authorized medical examiner, but such conclusions are
15 routinely discounted by the Chief of Medicine, Defendant Harlan Mellk.

16
17 107. In or around 2015, a doctor at Greystone responded to a twenty-seven-year-old female
18 patient in cardiac arrest. The responding doctor suspected that the cardiac arrest was related to
19 clozapine, but the Morbidity and Mortality Committee at Greystone determined the cardiac arrest
20 resulted from congenitally abnormal coronary arteries. However, doctors maintain that abnormal
21 coronary arteries can be caused by clozapine.

22
23 108. At least one Greystone physician is aware of sudden unexpected deaths in at least four
24 other patients aged twenty-seven to forty-five. Two of these deaths occurred in the presence of
25 the physician, who was delayed in offering aid because the “code cart” did not arrive in a timely
26 fashion. The code cart is a set of trays/drawers/shelves on wheels used for transportation and
27 dispensing of emergency medication and equipment at the site of an emergency for life support
28

1 protocols. These deaths were never reported to the Food and Drug Administration as possible
2 clozapine-related deaths. Despite doctors' suspicions and the Medical Examiner's conclusions,
3 Defendants ignored the dangers of clozapine and effectively prohibited the Food and Drug
4 Administration from further investigation into potential clozapine-related cardiac arrests.
5

6 109. In or around the time of this filing, crippled by the shortage of doctors, Defendants elected
7 to stop prescribing critical antipsychotic medications to patients in several units because there are
8 not enough physicians to monitor the side effects or perform the necessary lab work. A psychiatric
9 hospital is now no longer prescribing psychiatric medication to many of its patients who
10 desperately need it.
11

12 **VIII. PREVENTABLE DEATHS AND SUICIDE ATTEMPTS**

13 110. Defendants have largely failed to remedy the inherent dangers and the physical
14 infrastructure, which have contributed to the increasingly dangerous conditions at Greystone.
15

16 111. For example, in or around Spring 2017, a patient on Unit D2 dove off the Patient
17 Information Center (hereinafter "PIC") counter head first and fractured his neck in what was
18 apparently a suicide attempt.

19 112. In or around October 2017, a patient attempted to hang herself. In full view of staff, she
20 sat on the counter of the PIC, popped a ceiling tile from the ceiling, reached a computer cable wire
21 and twirled it six times around her neck. Her suicide attempt was nearly successful until a staff
22 member inserted his fingers within the noose to relieve pressure, and a police officer used a utility
23 knife to cut the cable. The officer's knife inadvertently cut a hand tendon of that staff member,
24 necessitating surgery. Three weeks later, the same patient attempted to commit suicide in the same
25 manner. This was the fourth time that this patient attempted the same act. Defendants did not
26 prevent and remedy this dangerous condition.
27
28

1 113. A few weeks later, another patient jumped on the counter to attempt suicide in the same
2 way.

3 114. On or around February 10, 2018, a patient on Unit A3 knocked out two ceiling tiles to use
4 the cables located above the tiles to hang herself.

5 115. Doctors have informed Defendants that the computer cables near the ceiling should be
6 suspended out of reach of patients to prevent suicide attempts by hanging. Doctors also suggested
7 that the PIC be elevated or fixed with Plexiglas to protect patients and staff from harm. Defendants
8 did not implement a solution which would have cost less than two dollars per unit. These
9 foreseeable suicide attempts due to unsafe conditions continue to the present.
10

11 116. On or around March 31, 2018, an employee suffered cardiac arrest and subsequently died
12 while on duty at Greystone. Critical lifesaving equipment had been removed from the code carts,
13 and as a result, no Advanced Cardiac Life Support could be administered. The psychiatrist first
14 on the scene stated that the emergency response rendered to this employee was “a complete
15 travesty.”
16

17 117. Defendant Mellk repeatedly stated to the staff doctors that the code cart was of no value,
18 contrary to this being the universal standard of care for emergency rooms, hospitals, and
19 paramedics responding to out-of-hospital cardiac arrests in this country. Despite widespread
20 condemnation and disapproval, Defendant Mellk eliminated the Advanced Cardiac Life Support
21 course after being in place since at least 2008 as a part of Defendants’ agenda to avoid liability.
22

23 118. All the cardiac medications, including epinephrine, had been removed. Epinephrine is
24 used intravenously to restore blood pressure, make the heart more amenable to defibrillation during
25 cardiac arrest, or when severe hypotension is present.
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1 119. Many Greystone patients are on medications that can cause sudden cardiac arrest from
2 lethal arrhythmias, and the means of which to increase their chances of survival are being
3 systematically dismantled by Defendants.

4 120. For example, in or around 2017, a patient suffered from cardiac arrest, and there was no
5 epinephrine in the code cart. The patient may have been saved if epinephrine were available during
6 the narrow window of opportunity as the patient's blood pressure could have been restored.
7 Furthermore, equipment for advanced airway management, such as the King tube, which can be
8 inserted safely within seconds, had been removed from the code cart. The Kelly clamp and scalpel
9 that would have allowed an emergency procedure in the event of a respiratory arrest from complete
10 airway obstruction had been removed. For the purpose of saving only \$60 per code cart,
11 Defendants forfeited the opportunity to save someone who is choking.
12

13 121. In or around May 2016, a patient on Unit F2 smuggled a razor into Greystone and slit her
14 wrist during the night. When she was discovered in the morning by staff, she was unresponsive,
15 completely pale from blood loss, and her blood had seeped through her mattress and formed a pool
16 on the floor. She was dying. Defendant Mellk, first on the scene in response to the code "BLUE,"
17 did nothing but wait for the paramedics to arrive and continued to allow the patient to die. When
18 another doctor arrived and attempted to give life-saving aid, Defendant Mellk initially physically
19 obstructed that doctor to forward his own agenda of non-intervention. Defendant Mellk wanted to
20 wait for the paramedics in order to avoid liability. The other doctor, fortunately, elected to push
21 past Defendant Mellk and saved this patient's life.
22

23 122. In or around September 2017, a geriatric male patient on Unit E1 had a code "BLUE" as
24 he was diaphoretic, was confused, and had a blood pressure of 200/90 and a heart rate of 160. This
25 life-threatening event was interpreted by the responding physician as supraventricular tachycardia.
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1 Defendants eliminated intravenous adenosine from the code cart, which may have prevented the
2 patient from going into full-blown cardiac arrest.

3 123. On or around January 22, 2018, a code “BLUE” was called on Unit E1 wherein an elderly
4 diabetic female patient was having severe symptomatic hypoglycemia. She was unresponsive.
5 When the responding medical doctor attempted to administer life-saving intravenous medication,
6 he discovered that the code cart had no intravenous catheters, and one had to be brought from a
7 different unit.
8

9 124. On or around March 4, 2018, a patient on the second floor of Greystone was suffering
10 from symptomatic bradycardia (a heart rate of about thirty). The responding medical doctor
11 discovered that the code cart did not have intravenous atropine as it did in the past, which would
12 have allowed the physician to bring the heart rate up to normal. The patient’s life was in jeopardy,
13 and he had to be rushed to Morristown Medical Center.
14

15 125. In or around May 2018, Defendant McQuaide attempted to decrease the evening medical
16 staffing from two Medical Officers of the Day to one, who would be responsible for an excess of
17 five hundred patients. The plan required covering doctors to work sixteen-hour weekend days as
18 a part of their regular work week, in a cost-saving measure. The practice of requiring doctors to
19 work sixteen-hour shifts is a strategy to preclude them from earning overtime hours, thus saving
20 in overhead costs. This reckless practice disregarded the quality of care and created an untenable
21 schedule for most staff doctors.
22

23 126. On or around November 19, 2018, a patient on Unit F3 died of an apparent pulmonary
24 embolus with a deep vein thrombosis.
25

26 127. On or around November 20, 2018, Defendant Mellk announced at the Department of
27 Medicine meeting that he would seek to block a Root Cause Analysis of the patient’s death.
28

1 According to one physician present at the Department of Medicine meeting, the Root Cause
2 Analysis would serve to fully investigate the patient's death, the quality control of the hospital,
3 and the use of Basic Life Support over Advanced Cardiac Life Support.

4 128. This patient's death should have been prevented with timely transfer to an emergency
5 room or with stabilization with Advanced Cardiac Life Support. The patient should have been put
6 on the cardiac monitor for rhythm analysis and monitoring.

7 129. Following a proper emergency room evaluation, the patient should have been admitted
8 for observation, placed in a 24-hour observation unit in the emergency room, or even discharged
9 with an ambulatory heart monitor. In this case, however, the responding doctors used only Basic
10 Life Support, never placed the patient on a cardiac monitor, and never considered transfer to an
11 emergency room until it was too late.

12 130. On or around December 5, 2018, Defendant Mellk, unsuccessful in blocking the Root
13 Cause Analysis, announced that the Analysis had taken place and determined that all life-saving
14 measures were taken to save this patient's life. The Analysis also concluded that the patient did
15 not need transfer to the emergency room because his vital signs were stable despite documentation
16 showing that the patient presented with anxiety, agitation, dizziness, light headedness, altered
17 mental status, and near syncope. These symptoms are characteristic of pulmonary emboli, and the
18 physicians would have recognized them as such had Greystone continued use of Advanced Cardiac
19 Life Support.

20 131. On arrival to this patient, the attending paramedics intubated him, gave intravenous
21 epinephrine, performed CPR at a higher compression and ventilation rate, and performed
22 Advanced Cardiac Life Support. These interventions should have taken place by Greystone staff
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1 had the hospital still mandated Advanced Cardiac Life Support over Basic Life Support and had
2 the code cart been supplied with the necessary materials.

3 132. The measures taken by the attending paramedics demonstrate the standard of care for
4 emergency response. Greystone's failure to provide this standard of care not only cost this patient
5 his life, but also continues to place the health and safety of other patients at risk.
6

7 **IX. FAILURE TO PROVIDE NECESSARY MEDICAL CARE AND SECURITY**

8 133. Defendants sought to avoid liability by removing life-saving equipment from the code
9 carts. Defendants also failed to provide critical life-saving training for staff. Further, Defendants
10 implemented new policies below the standard of care and recklessly endangered the patients and
11 staff. Defendants ordered the dismantling of Greystone's Emergency Medical Response to reduce
12 medical liability. Since the opening of the "new" Greystone in 2008, the emergency medical
13 response protocol has paralleled the paramedic's standard of care.
14

15 134. Defendants have never provided adequate life-saving training to its staff. Prior, when
16 Defendants provided an in-house Advanced Cardiac Life Support and CPR Course that all nurses
17 and doctors were required to take, the instructor provided the answers to the examination questions
18 by projecting them on the screen. Everyone received a score of 100. On or around November 24,
19 2013, Defendants did not provide the requisite CPR course. Rather, the participants merely
20 watched a video, and the instructor gave a demonstration. No written material was provided.
21 Participants received an American Heart Association CPR card without performing CPR.
22

23 135. As of 2017, Defendants formally implemented basic CPR without Advanced Cardiac Life
24 Support, despite the obvious risk to patient safety. On or around March 17, 2017, Defendant
25 Valerie Mielke, Assistant Commissioner of the Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services,
26 issued Administrative Bulletin 3:42 requiring that all staff be certified in Basic Life Support and
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1 stating that Advanced Cardiac Life Support would no longer be required. After eight years of
2 Advanced Cardiac Life Support training, this protocol and educational support for doctors and
3 nurses was eliminated. Per Defendant Robert Eilers, Medical Director for the Division of Mental
4 Health and Addiction Services, the State wanted to reduce its potential liability in life-threatening
5 scenarios. Defendant Eilers also expressed a lack of confidence in Greystone doctors and nurses
6 to adequately perform Advanced Cardiac Life Support and noted that Basic Life Support is more
7 accessible to a layperson.
8

9 136. Defendant Akerele routinely orders psychiatrists to work multiple adjoining shifts. For
10 example, psychiatrists are forced to work night shifts from midnight to 8 am, and then subsequently
11 mandated to work the consecutive day shift unless they use their own leave time. Defendant
12 Akerele forced doctors to work sixteen-hour shifts on a regular basis to compensate for the
13 shortage at the expense of patient safety.
14

15 137. In addition to overworked doctors, Defendants have also failed to remedy security issues
16 that have resulted in multiple patient escapes. For example, in or around Spring 2017, a patient
17 kicked open the unit exit door and subsequently kicked open the rear exit door and fled. The
18 person who chased him down an eighth of a mile was a physician in his sixties and not security
19 personnel. The patient was returned to the same exact hazard with the same unit and room.
20

21 138. The security flaw that security doors, if kicked hard enough, will open was not addressed.
22 Subsequently, a few months later, the same patient once again kicked open his unit exit doors and
23 two more security doors before exiting the building. He then left Greystone, took a bus to Morris
24 Plains, and then a train to his mother's home in Hudson County. He was returned to Greystone
25 two days later when the patient's mother called for him to be picked up.
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1 139. On or around September 3, 2018, a patient on Unit G3 managed to push his way out of
2 the unit and all the way to the lobby. He was bought back to his unit by the police, but there was
3 no doctor to treat him or to write an order for emergency medication. Staff on Unit G3, prior to
4 his escape, called a psychiatrist for medication, but no doctor was available.
5

6 140. On or around June 23, 2017, the aforementioned Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
7 Services (an agency under the federal Department of Health and Human Services) issued a sixty-
8 one-page "Summary Statement of Deficiencies," which concluded that Greystone was out of
9 compliance in the following areas:

- 10 • Structure of its Governing Body: "The Governing Body failed to demonstrate it
11 is effective in carrying out the responsibilities for the operation and management
12 of the Hospital."
- 13 • Patient Rights: "It was determined that the facility failed to protect and promote
14 the rights of each patient" including "fail[ing] to ensure the safety for all patients."
- 15 • Medical Staff: "The facility failed to ensure that adequate Medical Staff is
16 provided."
- 17 • Food and Dietetic Services: "The governing authority failed to ensure the daily
18 management of Food and Dietetic Services. Also the governing authority failed
19 to ensure that the nutritional needs of the patients are met in accordance with
20 practitioners' orders" and that the food service equipment was cleaned and
21 sanitized in accordance with New Jersey state sanitary codes.
- 22 • Physical Environment: "The facility failed to ensure the overall hospital
23 environment is maintained for the safety and wellbeing [of] patients," including
24 proper storage and removal of trash, proper water drainage and adherence to
25 proper structural guidelines.
- 26 • Infection Control: "Based on staff interview and document review conducted on
27 6/22/17 and 6/23/17, it was determined that the facility failed to ensure that staff
28 are screened for tuberculosis (TB) annually according to the CDC guidelines,"
"ensure that it follows the manufacturer's instructions for the germicidal wipes,"
and "ensure an Infection Control program for identifying, reporting, investigating,
and controlling infections and communicable diseases of patients and personnel."

1 **X. INTENTIONAL MISDIAGNOSES OF THE DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED**

2 141. Developmentally disabled patients at Greystone are not receiving the appropriate
3 treatment or standard of care due to intentional misdiagnoses and the removal of their Division of
4 Developmental Disability (hereinafter “DDD”) eligibility and services.
5

6 142. Defendants implemented a scheme to eliminate DDD eligibility for Greystone patients to
7 decrease DDD’s fiscal responsibility.

8 143. Prior to February 2014, Defendants refused to approve a patient for DDD services even
9 though that patient: (1) met the criteria to be DDD-eligible; (2) had been previously deemed DDD-
10 eligible; (3) had an IQ of 48, which is the lowest score on the IQ scale; (4) was to found to meet
11 the criteria for application for DDD services by various treating clinicians; and (5) was believed
12 to be DDD-eligible by a court.
13

14 144. On or around February 26, 2014, Defendants were apprised that eleven of the twelve
15 DDD-eligible patients remained involuntarily committed in the highly restrictive environment of
16 Greystone after being clinically deemed no longer needing inpatient hospitalization. These
17 individuals remained committed for a time frame ranging from 163 days to 1,948 days, with an
18 average of 505 days.
19

20 145. Another example occurred when a patient who was committed at Greystone and who
21 already had lived in an apartment as part of her DDD benefits lost her apartment during the course
22 of her commitment. After the civil commitment court confirmed that she was eligible for release,
23 the loss of her housing caused her to remain at Greystone for a year longer than necessary.
24

25 146. Defendants falsely diagnosed patients with mental illness to preclude DDD eligibility,
26 notwithstanding the fact that patients had previously been receiving DDD services.
27
28

1 147. On or around July 20, 2017, Defendant Lisa Ciaston, Legal Liaison for the Department
2 of Human Services, Division of Mental Health and Addiction Services, was informed that DDD
3 patients were being inappropriately diagnosed with mental illness so that those patients could be
4 controlled through medication, even though they did not suffer from mental illness.
5

6 148. On or around August 11, 2017, Defendants were placed on notice that DDD patients were
7 subjected to unconstitutional conditions during their long civil commitments at Greystone. These
8 conditions included DDD patients being targeted and “taken advantage of,” both sexually and to
9 transport contraband, including drugs.
10

11 149. On or around August 21, 2017, Defendants were placed on notice regarding the failure of
12 Greystone to properly insulate DDD patients from harm at the hands of aggressive patients.

13 **XI. EMPLOYEE RETALIATION RATHER THAN REMEDIATION**

14 150. Defendants have engaged in a plan to eliminate all voices of dissent within Greystone and
15 have proactively sought out vocal employees to eliminate them from the workforce. High-ranking
16 officials have been removed as part of Defendant McQuaide’s effort to purge anyone who spoke
17 out against her conduct. Defendants misrepresent the psychiatric staffing levels to give the false
18 impression that they complied with the report of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
19 and to silence concerns expressed by advocacy groups.
20

21 151. In or around August 2017, the Acting Medical Director and the Medical Staff
22 Organization President, who were both outspoken about the conditions at Greystone, were forced
23 off the Executive Management Committee by Defendants. Simultaneously, the Committee was
24 expanded with non-physicians, leaving Defendant Mellk as the only physician on the Committee.
25 Despite being a psychiatric facility, no psychiatrists remained on the Committee.
26
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1 152. In or around March 2018, a high-ranking doctor voiced opposition and was suspended.
2 On or around April 11, 2018, an Ad Hoc Committee appointed to review the doctor's suspension
3 found that there was no justification for the suspension, characterizing it as pretextual and
4 retaliatory.

5
6 153. In or around 2017, Defendants requested Greystone's Director of Performance
7 Improvement and Utilization Management to compile the Greystone assaults since 2013. The
8 director accessed the internal Unusual Incident Reporting and Management System and was
9 alarmed by the number of assaults he found. He subsequently provided those figures to Defendants
10 and his direct supervisor, Dr. Dorothea Josephs-Spaulling, Director of Quality Management.
11 Defendants instructed the director, "do not share these numbers with anyone, especially the doctors
12 and the public." When the director continued to express his concerns regarding the high rate of
13 assault, he was suspended by Defendants and accused of falsifying data.

14
15 154. On or around February 12, 2018, the Director of Safety and Operations refused Defendant
16 McQuaide's instructions to change the data with regard to assaults. He was subsequently
17 reassigned to be supervised by Dr. Dorothea Josephs-Spaulling, the same individual who
18 suspended the Director of Performance Improvement and Utilization Management. The Director
19 of Safety and Operations was thereafter relieved of duties that had been specific to his role for
20 eight years.

21
22 155. Less than two weeks later, this director was suspended and escorted out of the building
23 for refusing another order to falsify data from Defendant McQuaide.

24
25 156. In or around March 2018, the Acting President of Medical Staff Organization filed a
26 request for a meeting with Defendant Mielke regarding a doctor being unjustly removed from duty.

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28

1 Members of the medical staff viewed this as retaliation against the doctor for reporting the
2 malfeasance of Defendants and the “No Confidence” vote in the current hospital leadership.

3 157. At the time of this filing, the Medical Staff Organization’s grievance is currently being
4 heard. Staff psychiatrists are requesting the closure of units and cessation of new admissions as a
5 solution to the current crisis, the epidemic of violence, and the failure of the medical system. The
6 psychiatrists, in their joint grievance, state that “there is compromised patient care which could
7 easily lead to increased morbidity and mortality for the patients . . . and [the current understaffing
8 of psychiatrists at Greystone] precludes the ability to provide adequate quality of care and thus
9 leads to unnecessarily unstable patients and an unsafety [sic] work environment.”
10

11
12 **XII. INTENTIONAL MISREPRESENTATION OF INFORMATION TO THE**
13 **COURTS**

14 158. Defendants instruct witnesses at civil commitment hearings to materially misrepresent
15 their testimony to the court and its officers.

16 159. Virtually every patient is committed to Greystone Hospital pursuant to a court order.

17 160. Civil commitment hearings are formal court proceedings held by a judge at psychiatric
18 institutions to determine whether a patient requires involuntary commitment, or whether a less
19 restrictive alternative is appropriate. Pursuant to each patient’s liberty and due process rights, the
20 law mandates the State to ensure that patients are in the least restrictive environment where they
21 can live safely. All civil commitment proceedings require the sworn testimony of the treating
22 psychiatrist.
23

24 161. On or around December 4, 2017, the Chair of the Board of Trustees provided Defendant
25 Elizabeth Connolly, Acting Commissioner of the Department of Human Services, with a report
26 and recommendations of the Board of Trustees, stating, “it has become apparent that the current
27 administration is failing the patients and staff, requiring the board, and all unpaid volunteers to
28

1 raise these issues.” The detailed report concluded, *inter alia*, the intentional misinformation
2 provided to the courts.

3 162. Due to the mass departure of psychiatrists at Greystone, the remaining psychiatrists have
4 been forced by Defendant Akerele and other Defendants to “cover” civil commitment hearings for
5 dozens of patients the psychiatrists had never previously evaluated. These psychiatrists are not
6 members of the patients’ treatment team. Many times, psychiatrists have examined the patient
7 for a mere matter of minutes yet are expected to testify as an expert and proffer an expert report.
8 These brief examinations often take place the night before or even the morning of the court hearing.
9 Staff psychiatrists find this practice, which continues to this day, to be reckless and unethical. Staff
10 psychiatrists have repeatedly and openly protested Defendants’ unreasonable demands.

11
12
13 163. Since 2017, Defendants have explicitly instructed “covering” psychiatrists that they are
14 prohibited from testifying that they are unfamiliar with the patients, patients’ medical history, and
15 the specific facts of the patient’s case. The psychiatrists are also explicitly instructed to conceal
16 the fact that they are “temporarily covering” these patients and that they are in fact not part of the
17 patient’s treatment team.

18
19 164. Defendants justify their unlawful instructions by stating that the psychiatrists would
20 “make the hospital look bad” if they informed the court about their insufficient basis of knowledge
21 to testify.

22 165. Defendant Akerele and Defendant Oo are systematically engaged in the practice of
23 pressuring doctors to conceal material information from the civil commitment court, and punishing
24 doctors who refuse to lie.

25
26 166. For instance, in or around August 2018, a psychiatrist testified in court regarding his lack
27 of knowledge of a patient and how little time he had to prepare. Defendant Oo, who was present
28

1 during the sealed hearing, informed Defendant Akerele, who subsequently summoned the
2 psychiatrist into his office. Defendants yelled at that psychiatrist and instructed him never to testify
3 and offer that kind of information to the courts again.

4
5 167. In or around September 2018, Defendant Akerele again required a psychiatrist to testify
6 regarding a patient who the psychiatrist had never evaluated until the morning of the hearing.
7 When the psychiatrist told Defendant Akerele that s/he had no basis of knowledge to testify and
8 that s/he had not seen the patient or reviewed the chart, Defendant Akerele stated, "I don't care,"
9 and implied that there would be disciplinary action if his order was not adhered to.

10
11 168. On or around September 12, 2018, in a court calendar of nineteen patients, five cases had
12 no assigned psychiatrists, and the State could not proceed, thus violating the due process rights of
13 the patients. This establishes that at least five patients out of nineteen were at Greystone for an
14 extended period without psychiatric care.

15
16 169. Since in or around January 2017, most court calendars have had multiple adjournment
17 requests from the State due to the unavailability of a statutorily required treating psychiatrist.
18 Further, at virtually every hearing, psychiatrists either testify in court or report that they have little
19 basis of knowledge to testify about patients in court. Many cases cannot proceed for months
20 because of the unavailability of a treating psychiatrist.

21 **NAMED PLAINTIFF J.M.**

22
23 170. On or around September 3, 2014, J.M. was admitted as a patient to Greystone Park
24 Psychiatric Hospital. She was seventy-five years old at the time.

25 171. J.M. resided on an overcrowded unit.
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1 172. J.M.'s psychiatric diagnosis included bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
2 obsessive-compulsive disorder. J.M. also had, and continues to have, a medical diagnosis of celiac
3 disease.

4 173. While at Greystone, due to the lack of proper medical and psychiatric care, J.M.'s health
5 deteriorated significantly. She lost a dangerous amount of weight. Her medical condition
6 worsened. Her psychiatric condition deteriorated to the worst it had been in her life, eventually
7 causing her to become selectively deaf and self-isolative.

8 174. J.M. was subject to multiple unprovoked assaults. In or around November 2014, while
9 residing in Unit E1, J.M. was punched in her face by another patient and suffered bruising on her
10 eye and cheekbone.

11 175. Between 2015 to December of 2017, J.M. was assaulted on multiple other occasions by
12 aggressive patients. On or around March 20, 2018, J.M. was forced to shower, and then she was
13 kicked in the head by a Greystone employee.

14 176. On or around December 13, 2017, a patient violently kicked J.M. in her back. Defendants
15 did not respond to her family's pleas to transfer this assaultive patient. J.M.'s family requested
16 that J.M.'s attacker to be transferred to a different unit, but Defendants denied their requests and
17 stated that it was too difficult to transfer a violent patient. One Greystone employee even went as
18 far as stating, "this is a mental ward after all, what do you expect?"

19 177. It was only when a private attorney retained on J.M.'s behalf submitted a Notice of Intent
20 to Sue to the Greystone administration demanding the immediate transfer of J.M.'s attacker and
21 asking what measures Greystone would take to ensure J.M.'s safety that she was transferred on
22 December 14, 2017, after the 4:00 p.m. shift change.

1 178. Defendants do not have any effective policies or procedures to keep patients safe from
2 other assaultive patients. A member of the administration even conceded to J.M.'s family that
3 they do not have any implemented policies and procedures to combat patient-to-patient violence.

4
5 179. On or around December 18, 2017, J.M.'s private attorney sent a letter to Greystone
6 requesting a copy of their policies and procedures for addressing attacks on patients by fellow
7 patients and all security procedures implemented to prevent attacks. He also requested a copy of
8 the incident reports prepared because of prior attacks on J.M. Defendants did not respond or
9 provide any of the requested documentation.

10
11 180. On or around January 13 and 14, 2018, J.M. was sexually assaulted by a male patient,
12 who grabbed her genitalia. J.M.'s family was informed that when an incident such as this occurs,
13 the attacker is usually transferred to another unit. However, Defendants indicated that because
14 Unit E1 discharged so many patients, they were comparable to an admissions unit and their patients
15 were more likely to be agitated and act out. Defendants also stated that they were hesitant to
16 transfer J.M.'s attacker because there was a possibility that they would receive another patient who
17 would also put the patients at risk. Instead, J.M. was transferred to Unit F1.

18
19 181. Defendants do not make the appropriate efforts to find community placement for patients
20 who are no longer clinically dangerous and who have been ordered by a court to be discharged or
21 placed on Continued Extension Pending Placement (hereinafter "CEPP") status. Due to their
22 failure to seek new placements, CEPP patients are often subject to being recommitted when they
23 decompensate due to the poor quality of care and unnecessarily long hospital stays. For example,
24 a Greystone employee threatened J.M.'s family and stated that if the family did not find a new
25 residence by J.M.'s release date, Defendants would find a facility for J.M. that the staff "guarantee
26 the family would not like." During this time, Defendants purposefully refused to provide critical
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1 requested paperwork to potential discharge facilities, almost precluding her discharge entirely.
2 Further, Defendants' policy and gross negligence regarding something as simple as completing
3 basic paperwork for its patients forced J.M. to miss out on available discharge placements. J.M.'s
4 family was extremely involved and provided a list of at least five potential placements and
5 deposited thousands of dollars to the various facilities to secure placement. Even with the family's
6 proactive efforts, Defendants continued to hinder placement by failing to provide the facilities with
7 the necessary admissions documents to assess J.M. When a facility was finally secured,
8 Defendants failed in their duty to J.M. by refusing to complete paperwork necessary to obtain
9 Veterans Affairs benefits.
10

11
12 182. On or around March 28, 2018, J.M. was finally discharged to the community. Almost
13 immediately, her psychiatric conditions improved, and she began to communicate again. The
14 lasting damage and the toll on her physical condition from years of chronic, abusive treatment at
15 Greystone, however, will forever remain.

16 **NAMED PLAINTIFF S.C.**

17
18 183. On or around April 20, 2018, S.C. was admitted to Greystone. At the time of admission,
19 S.C. was 57 years old; her date of birth is May 26, 1960. S.C. was diagnosed with bipolar disorder,
20 post-traumatic stress disorder, and anorexia.

21 184. S.C. was initially treated on Unit B1, an admissions unit, under the care of psychiatrist
22 Dr. Young.

23
24 185. Upon admission, a medical doctor examined S.C. and found that her musculoskeletal
25 system was "all normal," with no abnormal gait. S.C. was initially treated with Abilify five mg
26 for depression, Depakote 500 mg for mood, Zoloft 200 mg, Ativan, and a nicotine patch.

27 186. In or around June 2018, S.C.'s lithium levels were tested at Greystone.
28

1 187. On or around June 22, 2018, S.C. was transferred to Unit E3. Around that same time, Dr.
2 Young informed her that he could remain as her treating psychiatrist. However, on or around June
3 24, 2018, S.C. met with a different psychiatrist.

4 188. On or around June 29, 2018, Dr. Ravi Baliga's Psychiatric Progress Note indicates that
5 S.C. was given Depakote 500 mg twice daily for mood, lithium carbonate 450 mg twice daily for
6 mood, Zoloft 200 mg daily for depression, Geodon 40 mg bid for augmentation of antidepressants,
7 and Vistaril 100 mg twice daily for anxiety. This same note ordered, "check serum lithium and
8 Depakote levels."
9

10 189. Prescribing Depakote requires monitoring blood levels for valproic acid after one week
11 of treatment, again one to two months later, and then every six to twelve months. The reason for
12 this monitoring is that there is a therapeutic range at which Depakote operates optimally.
13 Additionally, failure to monitor Depakote levels can induce Depakote toxicity, symptoms of which
14 can include coma, confusion, dizziness, hallucinations, and irritability.
15

16 190. Prescribing lithium also requires monitoring blood levels to establish therapeutic
17 effectiveness and to avoid lithium toxicity. A safe blood level of lithium is between 0.6 and 1.2
18 milliequivalents per liter. The toxic concentrations for lithium (≥ 1.5 mEq/L) are close to the
19 therapeutic range. Some patients abnormally sensitive to lithium may exhibit toxic signs at serum
20 concentrations that are considered within the therapeutic range, therefore close monitoring of a
21 patient prescribed lithium is the community standard. lithium toxicity can cause coma, delirium,
22 confusion, seizures, muscle weakness, agitation, and low blood pressure.
23

24 191. Despite Dr. Baliga's June 29, 2018, progress note ordering the "check serum lithium and
25 Depakote levels," her levels were not tested again until September 12, 2018, although S.C. made
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1 repeated requests for the same. S.C.'s levels were not tested for seventy-five days, which amounts
2 to malpractice. In that amount of time, a fatal amount of blood toxicity could have accumulated.

3 192. S.C. also made repeated requests to see a psychiatrist but was not seen by a psychiatrist
4 until a brief meeting in preparation of the July 17, 2018, court hearing and a short interview on
5 July 25, 2018.
6

7 193. S.C. was eventually assigned to psychiatrist Dr. Stewart, who saw her approximately once
8 per month.

9 194. On or around July 24, 2018, medical physician Dr. Amy Steinhardt ordered physical
10 therapy and an evaluation for S.C. due to "generalized weakness" related to "prolonged bed rest,"
11 "poor eating habits," and "medication sedation."
12

13 195. On numerous occasions, such as on or around July 25, 2018, and July 26, 2018, S.C.
14 complained of dizziness when ambulating. On or around July 25, 2018, Dr. Steinhardt was made
15 aware of the complaint. Despite concerns regarding S.C.'s equilibrium, no lumbar tests were
16 ordered.
17

18 196. On or around August 15, 2018, S.C. lost her balance, fell, and suffered an injury to her
19 right wrist. Dr. Steinhardt ordered an X-ray.

20 197. On or around August 20, 2018, orthopedic surgeon Dr. Christian J. Zaino of the
21 Orthopedic Institute of New Jersey examined S.C. for the wrist injury. On or around September
22 4, 2018, Dr. Zaino again examined S.C. for pain in her right wrist and determined the cause as
23 "most likely an old distal radius fracture" that was "exacerbated" by the fall on August 15, 2018.
24 On or around September 5, 2018, a "marked balance deficit" was noted, yet still, S.C. did not
25 receive testing to determine whether lithium and Depakote might have been the cause of her loss
26 of equilibrium.
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1 198. The cause of S.C.'s fall is likely due to the side effects from her prescribed psychiatric
2 medications. Greystone did not test S.C.'s blood levels until on or around September 12, 2018,
3 despite numerous pleadings with staff to see a doctor, S.C.'s own request for blood testing, and a
4 doctor's order to test her blood levels. Further, S.C. complained of dizziness on numerous
5 occasions during this time, but they were all ignored. S.C. was not placed on a "fall precaution,"
6 a protocol that is standard operating procedure for staff to undergo when patients are at risk for
7 falling due to physical condition or medication side effects.

9 199. Moreover, in or around the months of August and September 2018, S.C. was physically
10 assaulted by the same patient on Unit E3 on four separate occasions. Staff failed to keep her safe
11 from the cycle of continuing assaults.

13 200. On or around September 6, 2018, S.C. reported that she was physically restrained and
14 assaulted by her one-to-one observation Mental Health Technician.

15 **NAMED PLAINTIFF A.N.**

16 201. A.N. was born on August 15, 1993.

18 202. On or around July 26, 2007, the Hackensack University Medical Center Institute for Child
19 Development Interdisciplinary Evaluation Team diagnosed A.N. with Autism Spectrum Disorder.

20 203. On or around March 23, 2017, A.N. was admitted to Greystone.

21 204. On or around March 14, 2018, A.N. was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, bipolar
22 type.

23 205. On or around April 11, 2017, and again, on or around May 11, 2017, DDD Intake Worker
24 Trevor Wilson (hereinafter, "Mr. Wilson") sent letters to A.N. at his home requesting
25 documentation to complete A.N.'s application for eligibility.

26 206. On or around September 13, 2017, a patient assaulted A.N by kicking him in the head.
27
28

1 207. On or around September 18, 2017, Dr. Maria E. Xiques, Psy.D. (hereinafter “Dr. Xiques”)
2 completed a psychological assessment to determine whether A.N. has Autism Spectrum Disorder.
3 Dr. Xiques’ report includes a review of an EEG Report dated January 12, 2013, from the
4 Neuroscience Institute in Guayaquil, Ecuador, which noted epileptic activity.
5

6 208. On or around September 22, 2017, A.N.’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Aleksandar Micevski,
7 (hereinafter “Dr. Micevski”) included “Autistic Disorder” as a primary diagnosis in the Psychiatric
8 Commitment Hearing Report.

9 209. On or around September 26, 2017, the civil commitment court entered an Order requiring
10 a report from the Division of Developmental Disabilities (hereinafter “DDD”) regarding A.N.’s
11 eligibility for services to be presented to the Court by November 14, 2017.
12

13 210. On or around November 17, 2017, Dr. Micevski’s hearing report again listed “Autistic
14 Disorder” as a primary diagnosis.

15 211. On or around November 21, 2017, the court entered another Order referring to the
16 September 26, 2017, court Order for a DDD eligibility determination.
17

18 212. On or about January 6, 2018, January 7, 2018, and January 8, 2018, A.N. was medicated
19 for agitation with PRN lorazepam and haloperidol, at times more than twice per day. Haloperidol,
20 like many antipsychotic medications, is associated with a risk of epileptic seizure provocation.
21 PRN medication was routinely administered to A.N. for the duration of his hospitalization, often
22 leaving A.N. overmedicated, as evidenced by drooling and inability to maintain eye contact.
23

24 213. On or around January 12, 2018, Dr. Micevski included Autistic Disorder as a primary
25 diagnosis for A.N.

26 214. On or around January 16, 2018, the court entered an Order instructing Greystone to notify
27 DDD of the prior orders for a report regarding A.N.’s eligibility for DDD services.
28

1 215. On or around January 30, 2018, Dr. Yaser Daramna stated in a transcriptions report that
2 A.N. had a medical history of autism and that he suffered a seizure, tonoclonic, at Greystone.

3 216. On or around February 23, 2018, Autistic Disorder was not included as a primary
4 diagnosis in the hearing report for A.N. The Autistic Disorder diagnosis was excluded from all
5 Dr. Micevski's subsequent hearing reports.
6

7 217. On or around March 27, 2018, the court entered an order approving A.N. for Conditional
8 Extension Pending Placement status.

9 218. On or around April 23, 2018, a Greystone social worker submitted a hearing report stating
10 that A.N.'s application for DDD services was incomplete and no placement efforts were made,
11 despite the Orders dated September 27, 2017 and March 27, 2018.
12

13 219. On or around May 4, 2018, the social worker indicated that he completed the DDD
14 application for A.N., almost eight months after the original Order.

15 220. On or around May 17, 2018, the social worker's hearing report stated that the DDD
16 application was submitted to DDD on May 7, 2018.
17

18 221. On or around May 22, 2018, the court entered an order of Conditional Discharge, as A.N.
19 was still not linked with DDD services.

20 222. On or around June 4, 2018, A.N. was recommitted to Greystone.

21 223. On or around June 19, 2018, A.N.'s commitment hearing at Greystone could not be held
22 due to the lack of treating psychiatrist. A.N.'s commitment hearing was adjourned to July 3, 2018,
23 a date beyond 20 days from the June 4, 2018, commitment. On that date, A.N. was still without
24 DDD services.
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NAMED PLAINTIFF P.T.

224. P.T. was born on October 1, 1959.

225. In or around March 1988, P.T. was admitted to Camden County Health Service Center and transferred to the West Borough State Hospital in Massachusetts.

226. On or around August 8, 1991, P.T. was admitted to Camden County Hospital as a transfer from West Borough State Hospital in Massachusetts.

227. On or around January 14, 1992, P.T. was admitted to Greystone as a transfer from Camden County Hospital.

228. P.T. has been hospitalized continuously since 1988.

229. From 1982 to 1984, P.T. was hospitalized at Ancora Hospital.

230. P.T. is deaf and mute.

231. P.T. uses American Sign Language to communicate.

232. P.T. is diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder-bipolar type and borderline intellectual functioning.

233. P.T. resides on Unit A2, which is designated as a statewide specialized in-patient program for deaf and speech-impaired patients, and P.T. receives accommodation services.

234. In or around 2017, P.T. was attacked by a staff member at Greystone Cottage 14. That staff member kicked P.T. in the shin. P.T. was severely injured and required the assistance of a cane to walk after the attack.

235. On or around May 1, 2018, July 27, 2018, August 15, 2018, and August 17, 2018, P.T. was a victim of four separate physical attacks by the same patient on Unit A2. The August 15, 2018, attack caused a scrape and bleeding from his mouth and nose.

1 236. On or around August 28, 2018, the civil commitment hearing for P.T. was adjourned to
2 September 25, 2018, due to the treating psychiatrist's absence. On or around September 25, 2018,
3 P.T.'s hearing was adjourned again, due to the failure to secure an American Sign Language
4 interpreter for the hearing. At the time of this filing, P.T.'s hearing remains adjourned.
5

6 **FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

7 **(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)**

8 **VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH**
9 **AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION**

10 237. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations in all preceding paragraphs as if set forth
11 herein.

12 238. At all relevant times herein, the conduct of all Defendants was subject to 42 U.S.C.
13 Section 1983.
14

15 239. The action and inaction of Defendants complained of herein, individually and
16 collectively, constitute policies and practices maintained by Defendants.

17 240. Defendants have violated the rights of Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated Greystone
18 patients secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
19 Constitution.
20

21 241. Such violations include, but are not limited to, the denial of the right to a safe and humane
22 physical and psychological environment, the right to be free from State-created danger and from
23 the deliberate indifference to medical needs, and the right to be protected from patient-on-patient
24 assaults through proper patient supervision and staff training addressed to reducing the incidence
25 of hospital violence.
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1 district, or other instrumentality of a state or states or local government” 42 U.S. C. Section
2 12131 (1) (A) and (B) (1990).

3 248. Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital is a public entity within the meaning of 42 U.S.C.
4 Section 12131 (1) (A) and (B).

5 249. Plaintiffs and all other similarly-situated Greystone patients have mental disabilities
6 within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. Section 12102(2) and are qualified individuals with disabilities
7 within the meaning of 42 U.S. C. Section 12131(2).

8 250. Defendants have violated the rights of Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated Greystone
9 patients secured by Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U. S. C Section 12132 and
10 the regulations promulgated thereto, 28 C.F.R. Part 35., by but not limited to, the failure to
11 administer services programs and activities in the most integrated settings appropriate and by
12 needlessly placing them in institutional settings, and by failing to monitor such programs, services
13 and activities so that Greystone patients can enjoy these services free from harm from other
14 recipients. 28 C.F.R. Section 35. 130(b)(iv).

15
16
17
18 **FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

19 **(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)**

20 **VIOLATIONS OF THE REHABILITATION ACT**

21 251. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations in all preceding paragraphs as if set forth
22 herein.

23 252. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 provides, “[n]o otherwise qualified
24 individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall,
25 solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
26
27
28

1 benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
2 financial assistance....” 29 U.S.C. Section 794(a)(2002).

3 253. A “program or activity” is defined, in pertinent part as “a department, agency, special
4 purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or the entity of such
5 State or local government that distributes such assistance and each such department or agency (and
6 each other...local government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case of assistance
7 to a State or local government; [or] an entire corporation, partnership, or other private
8 organization... which is principally engaged in the business of providing...health care.” 29 U.S.C.
9 Sections 794(b)(1)(A), 794(b)(3)(A)(ii).

10
11 254. Greystone Park Psychiatric Hospital is a “program or activity” as defined by 29 U.S.C.
12 Section 794(b)(1).

13
14 255. Plaintiffs and all similarly-situated Greystone patients have mental disabilities within the
15 meaning of 29 U.S.C. Section 705(20).

16 256. Defendants, by their actions and inactions complained of herein, have violated and
17 continue to violate the rights of Plaintiffs secured by the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. Section 794
18 and the regulations promulgated thereto, 28 C.F.R. Pt. 41.51 and 45 C.F.R. Pt. 84, by limiting and
19 continuing to limit their enjoyment in the rights, privileges, advantages, and opportunities that are
20 enjoyed by other recipients of public programs when receiving aid, benefit or service.
21

22 **FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

23 **(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)**

24 **VIOLATION OF THE PATIENT’S BILL OF RIGHTS**

25
26 257. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations in all preceding paragraphs as if set forth
27 herein.
28

1 258. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-24.2 every patient in treatment has the following rights, which
2 cannot be denied under any circumstances: 1) to be free from unnecessary or excessive medication;
3 and 2) to be free from physical restraint and isolation except for emergency situations. Every
4 patient in treatment also is entitled to the following rights, which may only be denied for “good
5 cause”: 1) The right to privacy and dignity; 2) the right to the least restrictive conditions necessary
6 to achieve the purposes of treatment; and 3) the right to receive prompt and adequate medical
7 treatment for any physical ailment.
8

9 259. Plaintiffs and all other similarly-situated Greystone patients are “patients” or “patients in
10 treatment” for the purposes of N.J.S.A. 30:4-24.2.
11

12 260. Defendants have violated the rights of Plaintiffs and all other similarly-situated Greystone
13 patients secured by the Patient’s Bill of Rights, which violations include, but are not limited to:
14 denial of the right to privacy and dignity; denial of the right to keep and use personal possessions;
15 denial of the right to receive prompt and adequate medical treatment for any physical ailment; and
16 denial of the right to have individual storage space for private use.
17

18 **SIXTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

19 **(AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS)**

20 **VIOLATIONS OF NEW JERSEY INVOLUNTARY PSYCHIATRIC COMMITMENT**
21 **LAWS, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.1 TO 27.23 AND R. 4:74-7.**

22 261. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege the allegations in all preceding paragraphs as if set forth
23 herein.

24 262. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.1 to 27.23, the State of New Jersey is responsible for
25 providing care, treatment and rehabilitation to mentally ill persons who are disabled and cannot
26 provide basic care for themselves or who are dangerous to themselves, others, or property. N.J.S.A.
27 30:4-27.1 (a). It is the policy of the State that persons in the public mental health system are
28

1 required to receive inpatient treatment and rehabilitation services in the least restrictive
2 environment in accordance with the highest professional standards and which will enable those in
3 committed to treatment to return to full autonomy in their community as soon as it is clinically
4 appropriate.

5
6 263. Plaintiffs and all other similarly-situated Greystone patients are persons subject to civil
7 commitment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27m and therefore entitled to certain statutory rights,
8 including the right to a hearing within 20 days from initial commitment (N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.12), and
9 the right to periodic court review hearings of the need for involuntary commitment to treatment
10 and of the least restrictive environment for that treatment (N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.16). In all instances,
11 a psychiatrist on the patient's treatment team who has conducted a personal examination as close
12 to the court hearing as possible but in no event more than five calendar days prior to the court
13 hearing shall testify at the hearing. N.J.S.A. 30:4-27-13b.

14
15 264. Defendants have violated the statutory rights of Plaintiffs and all other similarly situated
16 Greystone patients by failing to provide sufficient staffing of psychiatrists to testify at scheduled
17 court review hearings, thereby resulting in prolonged hospital stays and violation of the right to
18 periodic review hearings.

19
20 **REQUEST FOR RELIEF**

21 WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court:

- 22 A. Certify this case as a class action pursuant to Federal Rule of civil Procedure 23;
23
24 B. Declare that Defendants' failures to comply with the mandates of the Fifth and
25 Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, Title II of the American's
26 With Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, New Jersey
27
28

1 Constitution Article 1, Paragraphs 1 and 14, Patient Bill of Rights, and New Jersey
2 involuntary psychiatric commitment laws are unlawful.

3 C. Enter a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from subjecting the named individual
4 Plaintiffs and members of the Plaintiff class to policies and practices that violate their
5 rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
6 Title II of the American's With Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
7 1973, New Jersey Constitution Article 1, Paragraphs 1 and 14, Patient Bill of Rights, and
8 New Jersey involuntary psychiatric commitment laws.

9
10 D. Require Defendants to provide Notice to all class members that if they suffered any
11 damages as a result of the Defendants' violation of their rights under the Fifth and
12 Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, Title II of the American's
13 With Disabilities Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, New Jersey
14 Constitution Article 1, Paragraphs 1 and 14, Patient Bill of Rights, and New Jersey
15 involuntary psychiatric commitment laws, that they may bring an individual lawsuit to
16 recover those damages.

17
18 E. Award Plaintiffs their reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred in the prosecution of
19 this action; and

20
21 F. Award such other equitable and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

22
23 **LOCAL CIVIL RULE 11.2 CERTIFICATION**

24 The matter in controversy is not the subject of any other action pending in any court, or
25 of any pending arbitration or administrative proceeding. I certify under penalty of perjury that
26 the foregoing is true and correct.
27
28

1 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17 day of December, 2018.

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